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ABSTRACT 
The management of security risk is widely viewed as a rational undertaking where 
accuracy is reliant upon the objective assessment of security experts. There is a 
traditional belief that experts have a greater understanding of objective 'risk'. 
However, when faced with uncertainty, both experts and laypersons rely on 
subjective mental frameworks, or heuristics, for making sense of complex 
environments. Where positive and negative affect such as feelings of 'good' and 
'bad' are introduced to judgements, an affect heuristic can be demonstrated. 
Utilising the psychometric paradigm as its theoretical :framework, the study measured 
aspects of an affect heuristic in expert perception of security risk to establish whether 
there was an impact on judgements made in the risk assessment process. The 
psychometric factors of dread risk and familiarity to risk were utilised as the 
objective measures of risk perception toward security risk scenarios constructed with 
negative and neutral affective words. The results were then evaluated in light of the 
variations in perceived levels of dread and familiarity recorded for a _sample 
population of20 security experts. 
The study demonstrated that the introduction of affect to security risk information did 
lead to variations in security risk experts' perceived levels of dread risk and 
familiarity to risk. As a result, the assessment of security risk could be considered 
subjective despite the expertise ofthe assessor. The study also showed that expertise 
created greater familiarity to risk, and as a result muted the influence of affect. The 
sample population believed the security risk scenarios to be high dread risk and 
moderate familiarity with risk. 
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DEFINITIONS 
Security 
Risk 
" .. .implies a stable, relatively predicable environment in 
which an individual or group may pursue its ends without 
disruption or harm and without fear of destruction or injury" 
(Fischer & Green, 1992, p.3). 
"The chance of something happening that will have an impact 
on objectives" (Standards Australia, 2004). 
Risk Management "The culture, processes and structures that are directed 
towards realizing potential opportunities whilst managing 
adverse effects" (Standards Australia, 2004). 
Expert 
Affect 
Heuristics 
"Someone who is widely recognized as a reliable source of 
knowledge, technique, or skill whose judgment is accorded 
authority and status by the public or their peers" (Wikipedia 
Online Encyclopaedia, 2005). 
"A subjectively experienced feeling or emotion and the 
observable behaviour that represents it" (Fielder & Bless, 
2001). 
" ... mental rules of thumb for reasoning or educated guesses, 
which reduce or limit the search for solutions in domains that 
are ambiguous, complex and difficult to understand" 
· (Shanteau, 1989). 
IV 
Psychometric 
Paradigm 
"An individual psychology-based research paradigm that aims 
to elicit judgments about risks from individuals who are 
confronted by risk stimuli" (Jackson, Allum & Gaskell, 2004). 
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CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
Society's perception of 'risk' has undergone a significant transformation over the last 
century. 'Risks' are now widely perceived in many aspects of the physical and man-
made environment. This reality is in stark contrast to the pre-industrialised era, 
where humanity's perception of risk did not extend beyond the next divinely 
imposed natural disaster or act of nationalistic conquest. 
The 201h century proliferation in expert 'risk' research and public concern can be 
linked to the intellectual development of society, industrialisation and shift from the 
pre-modem to post-modem era (Lupton, 1997, p. 10). Society now has a plethora of 
regulatory bodies and institutions, all of which have been established to effectively 
manage risks resulting from the development of modem industry and technology. A 
greater need to manage societal risks has the consequent effect of making 
governance and technological control increasingly challenging. 
' L~·~~~,,~~'-·' 
Beck (1992) emphasises that this 'high modernity' is characterized by every citizen 
being exposed, to some degree, to technological dangers such as radioactivity, 
airborne and waterborne pollution, and hazards from mass transportation such as 
airline, automobile or train crashes. Consequently, despite enormous financial and 
intellectual effort being expended by governments and industry to make life safer 
and healthier, society has grown more, rather than less concerned about 'risk' 
(Slovic, 2001). :t 
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Background 
Even as increasing industrial and technological complexity has required experts to 
develop objective measures for the assessment of 'risk', it has also bought about 
investigation into the influence of human psychology, society and culture on how 
human beings understand and perceive 'risk'. It can be argued that 'risks' are not 
objectively present in the environment, but are subjective creations mediated through 
cognitive, social and cultural influences (Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990; 
Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1980). 
The relevance of social risk theories has been repeatedly highlighted by the fact that 
individual perceptions of risk often do not appear to correlate with measurable 
probabilities of risk put forward by experts (Botterill & Mazur, 2004). For many 
experts, risk generally means expected annual mortality rates and probability of an 
impact (Morgan, 1993). However, for the layperson risk represents a more complex 
issue that also involves individualist factors like uncertainty, voluntariness, control, 
familiarity and dread, and contextual influences such as society and culture 
(Thompson et al, 1990; Slovic et al, 1980). 
One particularly influential theoretical framework, the psychometric paradigm, 
proposes that a number of subjective factors directly affect how risk judgements by 
experts and laypersons take place (Slovic et al, 1980). Namely, the degree of 
dreadfulness in relation to an event, how familiar is the risk c:tnd finally the number of 
people exposed. The overall emphasis of the psychometric approach is that 
individual judgement of these factors takes place under the influence of 
psychological, social, cultural and institutional elements. 
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In the context of the psychometric paradigm, it can be argued that both experts and 
laypersons "objective" perception of risk are influenced by speculative and 
subjective mental frameworks referred to as heuristics. These 'mental shortcuts' are 
required for making sense of complex environments and undertaking judgements in 
uncertain situations (Botterill & Mazur, 2004; Kahneman, 2002). This study shows 
that where affective elements such as feelings of 'good' and 'bad' are introduced to 
'objective' judgements involving risk, the presence of an affect heuristic can be 
demonstrated. 
While the subjectivity in individual risk knowledge has been widely publicised and 
generally accepted in academic risk research, the prevailing practice by government 
and industry in Australia is that risk assessments can provide objective measures 
through rational and analytical means. This belief is de1nonstrated by the wide 
acceptance of formal risk management standards such as Australia/New Zealand 
Standard 4360: 2004 Risk Management (Standards Australia, 2004) by security, 
emergency and law enforcement agencies as their overarching risk management 
framework for operational, tactical and strategic activities. 
However, it can be argued that the presence of an affect heuristic will actually result 
in the 'subjective' practice of "objective" risk management standards and principles. 
This subjectivity will be especially true in highly politicised cultures that manage 
emotive security issues such as terrorism, and where the popularity of "one size fits 
all" risk management models result in non-experts being given the responsibility of 
objectively assessing and managing risk (Australian Homeland Security Research 
Centre, 2005). 
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Study Significance 
The management of security risk is widely viewed by government and industry as a 
rational undertaking where accuracy is reliant upon the objective assessment of 
security experts. Although there is a traditional belief that experts have a greater 
understanding of 'objective' risk, extensive social research over the last two decades 
has shown that experts themselves suffer from their own perceptions, bias and 
subjectivities (Sjoberg, 1999; Solvic, 2001). As such, 'objective' risk management 
can be viewed as largely subjective and assumption driven. This study demonstrated 
how affect as a heuristic impacts on security experts 'objective' risk perception. 
By developing knowledge of how an affect heuristic and security risk perception 
interact, this study may also be able to provide security experts with an alternative 
theoretical foundation to enhance current 'objective' risk assessment practices. This 
outcome is significant in that the benefit would not only be valuable to security risk 
management practitioners in government and industry, but would also strengthen the 
relatively limited body of theoretical knowledge currently available to the security 
discipline. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to measure aspects of the affect heuristic in expert 
perception of security risk to establish whether there is a meaningful impact on 
judgements made in the risk assessment process. The underlying risk characteristics 
of the primary psychometric factors of dread and familiarity were utilised as the 
objective measures of security expert perception and attitude toward risk. The impact 
of negative and neutral affective information about common security risks were then 
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evaluated in light of the variations generated in perceived levels of dread and 
familiarity. 
By testing the target population of security experts, this research aimed to 
demonstrate that: 
• An affect heuristic does influence security expert risk perception; 
• The process of assessing security risk when affect is present is largely subjective 
despite the expertise of the assessor; and 
• Intuitive rather than rational judgements are more likely when affect is present in 
security risk information. 
Research Question 
To determine whether an affect heuristic influences expert perception of security risk 
the following research question was addressed: 
Does the introduction of affect to the communication of security risk information 
lead to variations in security risk experts' perceived levels of dread and 
familiarity? 
To ensure the research question was appropriately examined, the following 
objectives were set forward for completion: 
1. Construct semantic differential profiles (tabular representation) from the 
responses to neutral and negative security risk scenarios. 
2. ~ndependently discuss the semantic differential results from neutral and negative 
security risk scenarios. 
3. Compare and contrast the semantic differential results from neutral and negative 
security risk scenarios. 
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4. Present semantic differential data in a spatial factor representation of dread and 
familiarity, and discuss. 
Theoretical Background 
The psychometric paradigm was selected as the theoretical foundation for this study. 
The large number of empirical studies producing common results from the 
paradigmatic approach attests to its viability as a theoretical framework for risk 
perception research (Jackson, Allum & Gaskell, 2004). As this study aimed to 
measure security expert risk perception, the psychometric paradigm and it use of 
psychophysical scaling, appeared to be well suited to this purpose. 
Of particular relevance to this study were the paradigmatic concepts of dread and 
familiarity. These concepts not only provide a quantifiable structure to risk 
perception (Jackson et al, 2004 ), their inherently descriptive and emotive tone also 
mean affect can be measured and communicated in a mmmer that is conceptually 
aligned to 'emotion' and 'feelings'. Additionally, the use of dread and familiarity 
also captures the underlying emotive consequence of many security risks. 
The important role of heuristics in risk perception also underpinned a significant 
theoretical component of this study. Krimsky (1992, p. 17) highlights this 
importance, when he argues that the risk characteristics identified in the 
psychometric paradigm can be considered judgemental heuristics in their function. 
Measurement of a concept that is already recognised as being integral to the 
psychometric paradigm, albeit a variation utilising affect, lent additional robustness 
to the significance and purpose of this research. 
6 
Overview of the Study 
The study showed that the introduction of affect to the communication of security 
risk information did lead to variations in security risk experts' perceived levels of 
dread and familiarity. The psychometric factor space representation supported this 
outcome, with a meaningful variation between the neutral and negative security risk 
scenarios being evident. The sample population believed the scenarios to be high 
dread risk and familiarity with risk. 
The central theme emerging from the interpretation of the final study was that 
expertise as well as an affect heuristic influenced the risk perception of security 
experts. The study showed that the 'familiarity' the sample population experienced 
toward the scenarios as a result of their expertise, muted the influence of affect on the 
familiarity factor. 
Finally, the study outcomes demonstrated that meaningful results could be 
successfully applied in 'factor space' using the psychometric paradigm. The outcome 
was consistent with the viability of the paradigmatic approach and the large number 
of common results produced by empirical studies in risk perception. The study also 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
showed that semantic differential scales and affective words could be applied as a 
valid and reliable instrument to measure sample population risk perception. 
Study Limitations 
This. study's research instrument departed from the more conventional methodologies 
commonly applied in risk perception research. The validity and reliability of 
semantic differential scales that measure variations in dread and familiarity toward 
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security risk scenarios containing affective words cannot be supported by previous 
research methodologies. Although 'tests of reliably (Chronbach's alpha and paired-
sample t-tests) were considered moderately acceptable, similar study outcomes 
would need to be replicated with the research instrument to demonstrate the on-going 
viability of the methodology. 
Psychometric research is criticised for treating risk as purely objective, and not 
accounting for cultural or social bias hidden in the quantitative analysis (Shaw & 
Shaw, 2001; Lupton, 1997). The application of the psychometric paradigm for this 
study means the influence exerted by 'cultural and social agendas were not examined. 
Such an examination would have introduced contextual elements that could not be 
reliably interpreted within the theoretical framework or accurately represented in 
'factor space'. 
Empirical research into affective rationality is in its very early stages (Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, 2004), and as a consequence, the ability to 
generalise study outcomes in relation to an affect heuristic is limited. To counteract 
this limitation, the study applied recognised psychological research principles to 
demonstrate the presence of an affect heuristic. 
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CHAPTER2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review is to examine areas of knowledge, and take into 
consideration the impact this research may have upon the development of this study. 
Areas of research supporting this study are discussed under the following headings: 
Risk Perception; Heuristics and Rationality; Expertise and finally Research 
Methodology. 
Risk Perception 
Risk perception is subject to extensive debate in both academia research and industry 
practices. Despite a number of single theoretical perspectives of risk perception 
being put forward, none have been able to provide comprehensive and unified 
explanation or understanding of the concept. Lupton (1997) and Krimsky (1992, p. 
15) suggest these risk perspectives exist on a continuum between constructionism 
and realism, and are theoretically expressed in individualist and contextualist 
approaches. 
The most commonly accepted perspective remains the realist explanation for risk 
perception (Lupton, 1997). The realist perspective is reflected in the scientific and 
technical empiricism that objective risks exist as measurable properties in the 
environment. This philosophy is most frequently adopted by industry, and is 
reflected in the concept of risk as an expression of likelihood and consequence. 
Conversely, constructionism asserts that reality is only a subjective creation in which 
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risk does not exist independently of the individual, culture or society (Krimsky, 
1992, p. 15). 
The constructionist perspective of risk perception has much of its origins in Starr's 
(1969) seminal paper on social benefit versus technological risk. In this paper Starr 
attempted to reconcile the risk-benefit relationship through a "revealed social 
preference" approach, which assumes that the equilibrium between a risk and the 
benefit to society will reveal the overall acceptance of that risk (Fischhoff, Slovic & 
Lichtenstein, 1978). This outcome is established through the analysis of historical 
economic risk and benefit data, namely fatalities and individual spending, to identify 
patterns of acceptance. 
Although subsequent analysis of the methodology has identified number of serious 
empirical deficiencies and problematic conclusions (Fischhoff et al, 1978), Starr's 
paper can be credited for introducing the concept of individualist perception to 
technical risk research. One study outcome of particular importance was that " ... the 
acceptability of risk appears to be crudely proportional to ... the real or imagined 
benefits" (Starr, 1969, p. 1234). The implications of this statement proved to be a 
catalyst for psychometric studies into the issue risk-benefit tradeoffs and public 
response to natural and man-made hazards. 
The Psychometric Approach 
Psychometric study is concerned with the measurement and objective evaluation of 
knowledge, abilities, attitudes, and personality traits in indivuduals (Lemon, 1973). 
In risk perception research, psychometric studies have identified that "perceived risk 
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-----------------------------------------------------------
is the outcome measurement of the interaction of an individual and the external 
environment mediated through, cognitive structure" (Krimsky, 1992, p. 18). This 
perspective emphasises the rationality of human behaviour and the linear nature of 
cognitive processes in risk perception. Namely, there is knowledge of risk, leading to 
the development of individual attitude to risk and finally the adoption of a 
perspective on how the risk is understood (Lupton, 1997). 
The dominant theoretical framework in this field is considered to be the 
psychometric paradigm, which uses psychophysical scaling and multivariate analysis 
to produce quantitative measures of risk attitudes and perceptions (Fischhoff et al, 
1978). Measures of these attributes are considered to be directly 'expressed' 
preferences in attitude, as apposed revealed preferences through historic data 
proposed by Starr (1969). Fischhoff, et al. (1978) suggests the benefits of the 
psychometric approach to be identification of current individual preferences, 
sensitivity to changing values, and the consideration of subtle attitudes not available 
to probabilistic analysis. 
To achieve a psychometric measurement of perceived levels of risk, benefit and 
acceptability, between nine to eighteen risk characteristics have been applied as 
'attitude' structures against which individuals could quantitatively evaluate their 
perception. These risk characteristics were originally used by Slovic, et al. (1980) on 
the basis they represented concerns considered import~nt by risk assessment 
researchers at the time. Through factor analysis, several strong colorations between 
these characteristics have established the presence of two dominating dimensions, 
dread and familiarity. These relationships are identified in table 2.1. 
11 
Table 2.1 
18 Risk Characteristics and Factor Dimension Relationship 
Dread Familiarity 
Low Dread 
Controllable 
Not Globally 
Catastrophic 
Consequence not 
Fatal 
Equitable 
Individual 
Low Risk to Future 
Generations 
Easily Reduced 
Risk Decreasing 
Voluntary 
Doesn't Affect Me 
High Dread 
Uncontrollable 
Globally 
Catastrophic 
Consequence Fatal 
Not Equitable 
Catastrophic 
High Risk to 
Future Generations 
Not Easily 
Reduced 
Risk Increasing 
Involuntary 
Affects Me 
Familiar 
Observable 
Known to those 
Exposed 
Old Risk 
Effect Imniediate 
Risks Known to 
Science 
Little People 
Exposed 
(Slovic et al, 1980 & Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstien, 1986) 
Unfamiliar 
Unobservable 
Unknown to those 
Exposed 
New Risk 
Effect Delayed 
Risks Unknown to 
Science 
Many People 
Exposed 
For the purpose of this study, the nine-risk characteristic approach is considered most 
applicable. The application of the expanded eighteen characteristic approach would 
be problematic, with characteristics such as 'high risk to future generations' and 
'risk/benefit equity' having little obvious applicability to the immediate and 
generally pure risk nature of the security environment. The nine risk characteristics 
are identified in table 2.2. 
9 Risk Characteristics and Factor Dimension Relationship 
Dread Familiarity 
Low Dread High Dread Familiar Unfamiliar 
Controllable Uncontrollable Known to those Unknown to those Exposed Exposed 
Equitable Not Equitable Old Risk New Risk 
Individual Catastrophic Effect Immediate Effect Delayed 
Vohmtary Involuntary 
The qualitative measurements derived from the two-factor analysis of both the nine 
and eighteen risk· characteristic models have yielded a number of foundation 
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understandings in risk perception (Krimsky, 1992, p. 18; Botterill & Mazur, 2004). 
Firstly, what constitutes an acceptable level of risk is higher for natural risks than for 
technology-based risks. Secondly, risk taking activities undertaken voluntarily and 
perceived to be "controllable" and "well known", such as driving or smoking, are 
perceived as less risky and more acceptable. Thirdly, risks thought to have 
catastrophic potential, have an uneven distribution of affect, and are unfamiliar to the 
public and experts, are generally rated as 'riskier', more probable and more serious. 
When plotting dread and familiarity in factor space there is a clear indication that 
different types of risks are individually judged according to complex combinations of 
the above understandings (Botterill & Mazur, 2004). For example, nuclear power 
being located in the region of high dread and low familiarity (high risk) does not 
reflect the estimated probability of a nuclear hazard. Based on this quantitative 
assessment, it would be more reasonable to place this risk in close proximity to 
electrical power. The two-factor space model is identified infigure 2.1. 
Not 
c.ertafn 
tn be 
r~tal, 
co.rnnion, 
chronic 
Jnvolcmtory 
delayod 
unknown 
unconlrollabla 
~ cc 
• fr.Jc;d f'"C~581V<lt~n:•l'.' 
::mtbit;~l;!: . 
. 
•.:-of1tfilC'~p~j,1~.35 • 
UlU 
1 ao 
50 
I t~Jd·~rJr:t.. 
t!]~t.:rk: p;u.~~ 
b-.~r-;.;..~ ~~~~:'~~~~~ 
1.•0J 
. sc!! 
~utor • 
·,•ehk'-eo; 
• SP1oJ.:m9 
•::>ornmHcii:ll a·ti2't.ion 
• Cotta in to bu 
fata'l, dread, 
cotastrophlc 
• m;F'I·1'8-n.d.mb.r~ 
Volcmtary 
immediate 
known 
co ntro JJn bl e 
old 
Figure 2.1 Two-Factor Space Model: Dread and Familiarity 
(Slavic et al, 1980) 
----------------------------------------------------
13 
Variations in how risk is understood have been prominently explained by the 
difference between expert and laypersons judgement of risk (Sjoberg, 1999). Early 
research by Slovic, et al. (1980) established that when experts judged risk there was a 
strong correlation with technical estimates of annual fatalities, while laypersons 
tended to be sensitive to the influences of dread and familiarity characteristics, 
leading to a considerable variation in levels of perceived risk. Although this 
perspective suggests experts have a simplistic and linear "understanding" of risk, 
Sjoberg (1999) argues that structure of expert perception varies little from the 
layperson. As a result, experts can be expected to be equally sensitive to external 
influences, such as the political agenda of the organisation or agency they represent. 
Such external influence links to a key criticism of the psychometric paradigm, 
namely that the individualist approach does not consider risks in the social context in 
which they are experienced (Weyman and Kelly, 1999; Lupton, 1997, p. 23; Rayner, 
1992, p. 75). Lupton (1997) asserts that while it is convenient for psychometric 
testing and modelling to represent individuals as "atomised" rational actors, it has 
had the affect of eliminating the impact of social context in individual risk 
perception. Social context, and whether or not it has a role in risk perception, 
represents the fundamental difference between the individualist and contextualist 
perspective. 
Cultural Theory 
Cultural Theory represents the dominant contextualist explanation of risk perception. 
The approach originates from anthropological studies relating to the examination of 
ritual defilement in primitive religions and unity of shared experience these 
behaviours create in a society (Rayner, 1992, p. 91; Lupton, 1997; Douglas, 1967). 
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These studies implied that the acceptance or rejection of these practices is based on 
the association of an individual to a particular culture. The practice of these traditions 
can be viewed as a means .of imposing order on what is an inherently untidy and 
unstructured way oflife for many individuals. 
The emphasis upon the primacy of the social group, rather than individual cognition, 
in the perception, definition and management of risk is a key hypothesis put forward 
in Cultural Theory. In this hypothesis exists the principle source of conflict between 
Cultural Theory and the Psychometric Paradigm, as to which represents the primary 
social theory of risk perception. For'proponents of the Psychometric Paradigm, an 
individual will always perceive, define and manage risk according to qualitative 
judgements based on subjective properties (Slovic et al, 1986). 
The two conflicting individualist and contextualist frameworks lend themselves to 
the old argument, "which came first the chicken or the egg?" In the case of the 
Psychometric Paradigm and Cultural Theory this argument could be stated as, "does 
an individual's psychology and behaviour define their socio-cultural alignment, or is 
an individuals cognitive processes determined by the socio-cultural background?" In 
the arena of social risk theories this argument raises the dilemma of the primacy of 
these dominate social theories (Krimsky, 1992, p. 7). 
The key assumption that 'risks' are subjective constructs, rather than objectively 
present within the environment, is present in both Cultural Theory and the 
Psychometric Paradigm. The argument of which hypothesis has greater explanatory 
power is largely irrelevant, since the exclusiveness of either has relatively little 
impact upon the final outcome of how individuals and socio-cultural affiliation 
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perceive and treat risk. While human beings may subjectively construct risks as 
individuals, the nature of culture and society ensures that the individual will group 
with others who perceive risk in a like manner. As a consequence, cognitive risk 
perception can be expected to reflect the wider influence of that culture. 
Social Amplification ofRisk Framework (SARF) 
The concept of social amplification of risk is based on the proposition that events 
pertaining to risks interact with psychological, social, institutional, political and 
cultural factors in ways that heighten or attenuate individual or social perception of 
risk (Kasperson, 1992; Renn, Bums, Kasperson, Kasperson & Slovic, 1992). 
Although the major psychometric and cultural risk studies have provided 
explanations in this area, the approaches and findings, as discussed previously, have 
been fundamentally conflicting at the most basic conceptual level (individual versus 
contextual). 
SARF attempts to resolve this general disjuncture between realist, individualist and 
contextualist explanations of risk, by integrating research explanations and findings 
from these approaches (Petts, Horlick-Jones & Murdock, 2001). One of the principal 
risk research impasses the framework attempts to address is why some risks viewed 
as statistically low by experts, become a focus of wider social-political concern and 
activity, while other more potentially serious risks receive comparatively little social-
political attention. Breakwell & Barnett (2001) emphasise that social risk issues are 
only examined in the context of risk consequences. 
----------------------------------------------
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Social amplification of risk occurs when an event's information signals spread like 
'ripples' beyond the immediate zone of impact to influence stakeholders largely 
removed from its direct influence (Rennet al, 1992). Signals are received, interpreted 
and passed on by social "agents", such as individual experts, the public, 
organisations or social groups. Signal changes may be undertaken by agents to 
strengthen the importance of a message or to reinterpret or elaborate available 
information into a more acceptable form before passing on to other agents 
(Kasperson, 1992; Renn et al, 1992). These signal changes serve to amplify or 
attenuate the amount of information about an event or risk. The SARF is identified in 
Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 SARF 
(Kasperson, 1992 cited inPetts et al, 2001) 
SPREAD OF IMPACT 
SARF has particular relevance to the security environment, where there is an 
expectation that high profile risks such as terrorism wit! be managed to both 
institutionally and publicly acceptable levels. These expectations mean security 
experts are unlikely to "judge" risks in individualistic terms. It is more probable that 
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they will perceive "risk information according to the rules and expectations of 
their~ .. organisation" (Rennet al, 1992, p. 8). 
Such expectations imposed by an organisation are likely to be internalised and 
reinforced when an individual identifies with organisational goals, accepts 
institutional expectations and believes in the importance of how a risk should be 
judged (Rennet al, 1992). Petts, et al. (2001) and Renn, et al. (1992) contest that this 
social "colouration" significantly impacts individual perception by engendering 
patterns of understanding and the use of mental models for the future assessment of 
risks. This influence indicates the value of examining the relationship between 
attitude variations and the social context in which security risks are assessed. 
Heuristics and Rationality 
Heuristics are generally regarded as mental rules of thumb for reasoning or educated 
guesses, which reduce or limit the search for solutions in domains that are 
ambiguous, complex and difficult to understand (Shanteau, 1989; Solvic et al, 1980; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1982, p. 3). Heuristics are contrasted by the use of probalistic, 
statistical or rationalistic reasoning, where systematic methods and processes are 
applied to solve problems, for the purpose of achieving optimal results. 
In the area of risk and risk perception where judgements of probability and the 
prediction of values are a requirement, Tversky & Kahneman (1982, p. 3) argue that 
inherent complexity is reduced by a reliance on a limited number of heuristic 
principles referred to as Representativeness, Availability and Anchoring. Although 
Kahneman (2002) emphasises that these heuristics can be useful for guiding intuitive 
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decision-making, the subjectiveness of these judgements can result in severe and 
systematic errors. When unde1iaking risk assessments this process this can lead to 
serious incidents ofbias and misrepresentation. 
Heuristic Principles in Probalistic Judgement 
Bar-Hillel (1982, p. 69) defines the representativeness heuristic as a "subjective 
judgement of the extent to which an event in question is similar in essential 
properties to its parent population". For example, an individual could be expected to 
judge event B as being as probable as event A whenever B appears representative of 
A. Although it would be reasonable' to expect that the characteristics of event B 
would closely reflect event A, the presence of the heuristic means only a small 
element of event A needs only to be present for event B to be judged representative. 
In the context of security risk, judgements based on representativeness suffer from 
insensitivity to reality. As an example, a crime trend involving vehicle ram raids 
targeting retail premises with external glass, could lead to a 'representativeness' 
judgement that all shops with windows onto the street are likely targets for this type 
of offence. However, individual circumstances, such as the close proximity of a 24-
hour convenience store, would in fact significantly reduce the likelihood. In this 
instance, the representativeness heuristic will have led to a misrepresentation of the 
risk at this location. 
The availability heuristic involves individuals "assessing the frequency of a class or 
the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be 
bought to mind" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982, p. 11). Where 'availability' 
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judgements are made, there is little or no reference to the frequency or probability of 
previous related events. So where a high consequence low probability incident, such 
as a terrorist attack, takes place, the event's memorability will lead to an increase in 
the perceived 'risk' of future terrorist incidents. Such judgements mean the 
availability heuristic is a likely source of bias in risk perception (Slavic et al, 1980; 
Sunstein, 2005). 
Further misrepresentation and inaccuracy can also be associated with the anchoring 
heuristic, which involves individuals' tendency to cause judgements to be anchored 
on initially presented values (Slavic 'et al, 1980). For example, in a study conducted 
by Kahneman (cited in Ariely, Loewenstein & Prelec, 2002), a wheel of fortune with 
numbers ranging from 0 to 100 was spun, and subjects asked whether the number of 
African nations in the United Nations was greater than or less than that number. The 
subjects were then requested to estimate the actual figure. Final estimates were 
significantly related to the number spun on the wheel (the 'anchor'), even though 
subjects could identify that the number had been generated randomly. 
Dual Process Reasoning 
Since the early research conducted by Tversky & Kahneman on heuristics, there has 
been an increased focus on the dual process relationship between rational decisions 
and intuitive judgements (Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002). Unlike heuristics, which was 
originally viewed as a separate cognitive operation (Kahneman, 2002), dual process 
reasoning proposes that a heuristics-based holistic, affective and association driven 
(intuition) system coexists with an analytic, logical and reason oriented (reasoning) 
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system (Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002; Kahneman, 2002; Sunstein, 2005; Slovic et al, 
2004). 
Intuition system operations are believed to be fast, automatic, effortless, associative 
and difficult to control or modify, while the reasoning system is characterised by 
slower, serial, effortful and deliberately controlled operations (Kahneman, 2002). 
Kahneman & Fredrick (cited in Sunstein, 2005) suggest that the two systems do not 
operate autonomously, but rather, the intuition system provides quick answers to 
problems of judgement, to which the reasoning system operates as a monitor, so the 
judgements can be confirmed or overridden. An adaptation of the two-system 
scheme is identified in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3 Two-System Scheme 
(adapted from Slovic et al, 2004 & Kahneman, 2002) 
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One key proposition of the two-system approach is that the 'faulty' use of heuristics 
will not automatically lead to errors in judgement (Sunstein, 2005). The monitoring 
provided by the reasoning system will, under certain circumstances, allow 
individuals to overcome errors resulting from the use of heuristics. Sunstein (2005) 
also highlights that the capability 'check and balance' operation will vary, with 
individuals in possession of highly developed reasoning systems being more likely to 
recognise errors in heuristic-based judgements. In relation to this study, these 
assumptions mean that the often strong analytical background required by security 
experts may lead to a reduced impact from the affect heuristic. 
Affect and Judgement 
Despite the implied importance of the 'reasoning' capability, Slovic, et al. (2004) 
argues that affect or emotion also has a central role in the operation of the two system 
scheme. This perspective emphasises that affect is the central reference point or 
source for all judgements undertaken by the intuition system (Svenson & Slovic, 
2002; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic & Johnson, 2000). Functionally, this means an 
object or event requiring a judgement will result in a recollection of specific affect 
qualities of 'goodness' or 'badness' associated with previous experiences. These 
feelings, either unconsciously or consciously occurring, are then transferred onto the 
object or event, creating an emotive 'vibration' in the judgement. 
An explanation for the intrinsic role of affect in judgement can be found in the 
premise that conscious rational action is built on and guided by the basic biological 
structures of intuition, emotion and feelings (Damasio cited in Finucane et al, 2000). 
This explanation is reflected in the logical structure ofthe two-system scheme, where 
affect is involved it1· all judgments referred through the intuition and reasoning 
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systems. Ultimately, as Slovic, et al. (2004) emphasis, it is unlikely that analytical 
thinking could be rationally employed without the influence from affect during the 
judgement and decision making process. 
Apart from affect having a foundation role within dual process reasoning, recent 
research indicates that affect may also act as a specific type of heuristic (Finucane et 
al, 2000; Kahneman, 2002). An affect heuristic is believed to occur when automatic 
and rapid affective responses to events and objects substitute an individual's more 
systematic, considered judgements (Slovic et al, 2004). Direct substitution is able to 
occur, because representations of 'objects and events are 'tagged' with affect, 
resulting in automatic responses to consciously or unconsciously recalled elements. 
Kahneman and Fredrick (cited in Kahneman, 2002) argue that 'substitution' is the 
foundation of the heuristic process, in which readily recalled. attributes, such as affect 
or availability, substitute rational processes in the assessment of a judgment. 
Support for an affect heuristic can be drawn from the risk perception model proposed 
by Sandman (1987), in which he argues that the factors ofuncertainty, voluntariness, 
control, familiarity and dread all represent elements of a collective concept termed 
'outrage'. In this model an individual is likely to make judgements about risk based 
on the level of 'outrage' experienced, not on a rational assessment of objective 
evidence. This behaviour may indicate that experiences associated with the affective 
quality of 'badness' lead to direct behavioural expressions of' outrage'. 
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Affect and Communication 
Given this study aimed to measure and evaluate the impact of an affect heuristic, 
there is a requirement to understand how affect is manifested in observable 
behaviour. Without a quantifiable observation it is problematic as to whether a valid 
and reliable measure could in fact be developed for an affect heuristic. An 
explanation for the observable presence of affect in behaviour can be found in 
linguistic theory, and specifically the Sapir-Whorfhypothesis (Bamberg, 1993). 
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis argues that language provides much of the necessary 
structure for thought processes to occur. Without the definition and context of words, 
cognitive objects associated with perceiving the world, such as affect, could not be 
translated or communicated in structured and rational manner. Manifestation of affect 
can be observed behaviourally in use of 'goodness' and 'badness' as expressions of 
feeling and emotion. 
Since it is probable that words have affective qualities which impact on cognitive 
processes and objects (Bradley & Lang 1999), it appeared appropriate to use affective 
words as the observable and measurable component of an affect heuristic. This type 
of approach is supported by Bestgen (1994), who indicates that normative affective 
words have been successfully used in numerous studies designed to measure and 
evaluate the role of affect on cognitive processing. 
To ensure the affective words used in this study were valid and robust in terms of 
their normative valence (emotional orientation), an affective word list (ANEW) was 
obtained from the Center for the Study of Emotion and Attention at the University of 
Florida. This word list is freely distributed for non-profit research purposes, and 
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contains a set of normative ratings for over 2000 tested words in the English 
language (Bradley & Lang 1999). The suitability of the ANEW list has been 
demonstrated by its widespread application in psychological research on affect (Flint, 
2004; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Maeda, Piguet, Connally, Krendl & Corkin, 2004). 
Expertise 
Wikipedia Online Encyclopaedia (2005) defines an expert as someone who is widely 
recognized as a reliable source of knowledge, technique, or skill whose judgment is 
accorded authority and status by the public or their peers. This explanation closely 
reflects the legal definition provided by the Australian Corporations Act 2001 
(Cwlth) in which an "expert, in relation to a matter, means a person whose profession 
or reputation gives authority to a statement made by him or her in relation to that 
matter". 
Experts can be expected to have prolonged or intense experience through practice 
and education in a particular field. In specific fields the definition is established by 
consensus, meaning an individual does not require a professional or academic 
qualification to be accepted as an expert (Wikipedia Encyclopaedia, 2005). Eysenck 
and Keane (2004) support this definition by emphasising that expertise is developed 
through extensive practice and an accumulation of knowledge, rather than the 
presence of some basic individual capacity. 
For the purpose of this study, security experts are considered as such if they 
undertake risk assessments as part of their normal organisational/consultancy duties 
as a security . advisor, manager, analyst or industry consultant. The objective 
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requirement for 'expertise' will be achieved using a criterion based on the ASIS 
International (2005), Certified Protection Professional (CPP) accreditation: 
• Nine years of experience in a self managed security role; or 
• Five years of experience in a self managed security role and a Bachelor Degree 
(ASIS International, 2005). 
Sjoberg (1999) suggests that experts, regardless of their field, do not practice or 
apply their knowledge without bias. Rather they fulfil Protector and Promoter roles 
in society that represent individualist or collectivist ideals. The "Protector" considers 
their role to be the provider of warnings about risks that people have not considered 
or do not consider seriously enough. Conversely, the "Promoter" is focused on 
reassuring people that risks are not as bad or are safer than they appear. These roles 
again indicate that social context is a significant factor in determining how risks are 
perceived and ultimately addressed. 
Research Methodology 
Leedy (1997, p. 9) states that research methodology has two primary functions. 
Firstly, "to control and dictate the acquisition of data", and secondly "to capture the 
data after acquisition and extract meaningfulness from them". To be effective, the 
chosen research methodology for this study must meet two key criteria: 
1. Provision of accurate and meaningful measurement of security experts' 
attitude toward risk. 
2. Allow for the identification and quantification of the affect heuristic m 
security experts' attitude toward risk. 
26 
----------------------------------------------------
Creswell (1994), Preece (1994) and Leedy (1997) indicate that research is aligned 
into quantitative or qualitative paradigms. Creswell (1994, p. 1) defines qualitative 
research "as an inquiry process of understanding a social or human problem ... formed 
with words, reporting detailed views of informants in a natural setting". Conversely, 
quantitative study is defined as "an inquiry into a social or human problem, based on 
testing a theory composed of variables, measured with numbers, and analysed with 
statistical procedures in order to determine whether predictive generalisations of 
theory hold true" (Creswell, 1994, p. 1). 
These two definitions are sufficiently comprehensive to allow an appropriate method 
of research for this study to be determined. A quantitative approach is deemed 
inappropriate, since it is based on "testing a theory ... measured with numbers and 
analysed with statistical procedures". This study will utilise a qualitative approach, 
since there is an "inquiry process of understanding a ... social problem ... this is 
formed with words". 
Attitude Measurement 
Slovic (1992, p. 121) identifies perception and attitude as independent factors to be 
measured and evaluated in the psychometric paradigm. However, despite the stated 
independence, there is no demarcation between perception and attitude in this model. 
This usage is representative of the stance taken in social psychology, in which 
perception and attitude are regarded as separate cognitive functions, but at the same 
time highly interdependent elements in the formation of knowledge structure (Fiedler 
& Bless, 2001, p. 122). The affect of this interdependence on psychological testing is 
such that a measurement of attitude is generally viewed as an equal measurement of 
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perception. Given the availability of tools for measuring attitude, for the purpose of 
this study, attitude has been chosen as the measure of risk perception. 
Lewin (1979) and Thorndike (1997) suggest that anything, including attitude, can be 
measured. However, unlike statistically orientated data, measurement and evaluation 
of attitude cannot be achieved in a conclusive manner. Researchers may only make 
inferences about attitude from an observable indicator, such as a response to a 
statement, or the observation of an individual's overt behaviour (Anderson, 1988, p. 
423). Such indicators represent manifestations of attitude, which must then be 
measured against a defined dimension. 
Two major weakness associated with attitude measuring instruments is the ease in 
which they can be constructed and the indirectness of measurement through the use 
of verbal statements to make inferences about 'real attitudes' (Thorndike, 1997; 
Anderson, 1988, p. 425; Bums, 1997). In response, Oppenheim (1986) and Kifer 
(cited in Anderson, 1988, p. 424) emphasis practicing the following principles of 
measurement during instrument construction: 
1. Identify the specific characteristics of the target concept against which 
attitude will be measured. 
2. Achieve homogeneity or the focus on one concept at a time; confusion over 
the contents of an item weakens the reliability and validity of the instrument. 
3. Apply linearity and equal appearing intervals; a scale provides a scoring 
system for statistical purposes and measurable dimensions for attitude 
concepts. 
28 
The importance of linearity dictates that, in most circumstances, attitude 
measurement is undertaken througli the application of a scale (Bums, 1997; 
Oppenheim, 1986). The three most commonly used scaling techniques are the Likert 
method, the Thurstone scale and the Semantic Differential (Hopkins, Stanley & 
Hopkins, 1990; Bums, 1997). The wide acceptance of the Likert and Thurstone 
scales mean it would be appropriate to apply either one of these instruments for this 
study (Anderson, 1988, p. 427; Thorndike, 1997; Lewin, 1979; Hopkins et al, 1990). 
However, the psychometric paradigm use of contrasting adjectives to describe the 
dread and familiarity risk characteristics lends substantial weight to the application of 
the Semantic Differential. 
The Semantic Differential 
The Semantic Differential measures an individual's reaction to stimulus words and 
concepts with ratings on bipolar scales defined with contrasting adjectives at each 
end (Heise, 1970; Bums, 1997; Lemon, 1973; Nachmias & Nachmias, 1992). Words 
are selected for each scale on the basis they capture the range of attitude intensity 
toward an object. For example, semantic differential scales measuring individual 
attitude toward the concept of 'myself may utilise adjectives such as good-bad, 
rigid-flexible and independent-submissive (Bums, 1997). 
Early semantic differential research, which evaluated large numbers of adjective 
combinations, established that ratings on bipolar adjective scales tend to be highly 
correlated toward three basic dimensions commonly referred to as Evaluation, 
Potency and Activity factors (EPA conceptual framework) (Heise, 1970; Bums, 
1997; Lemon, 1973). The central concepts of the EPA framework can be represented 
29 
-----------
by the adjective scales of good-bad for Evaluation, weak-strong for Potency, and 
fast-slow for Activity. 
The Evaluation factor is considered the most critica] dimension, because it directly 
estimates an individual's attitude toward an object (Burns, 1997; Lemon, 1973). The 
Potency and Activity factors are generally considered supporting dimensions that 
increase the overall accuracy of the scale. Typically, a concept is rated on several 
scales associated with a single dimension, with the results averaged to provide a 
single factor score for each dimension (Heise, 1970). An example of a semantic 
differential scale measuring individual attitude toward their customer service 
experience is identified in Figure 2. 4. 
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Figure 2.4 Semantic Differential Scale (University of Maryland, 2005) 
Conclusion 
The dominant theoretical framework in risk perception research is considered to be 
the psychometric paradigm. For the psychometric paradigm to achieve a 
measurement of perceived levels of risk, between nine and eighteen risk 
characteristics have been used as 'attitude' structures against which individuals 
quantitatively evaluate their perception. Through factor _analysis, several strong 
colorations between these characteristics have established the presence of two 
overarching dimensions, dread and familiarity. 
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Early research usmg the psychometric paradigm established that when experts 
judged risk there was a strong correlation with probabilistic data, while laypersons 
were sensitive to the influence of dread and familiarity characteristics. More recent 
research argues that expert perception varies little from the layperson, since expertise 
is developed through extensive practice and an accumulation of knowledge, rather 
than the presence of some basic individual capacity. This means experts are also 
equally sensitive to external influences in complex judgements, such as those 
proposed by the social amplification of risk framework (SARF). 
Where judgements of probability and the prediction of values are required, it is 
argued that inherent complexity is reduced by a reliance on heuristic principles and 
the dual process relationship between rational decisions and intuitive judgements. 
Dual process reasoning proposes that a heuristics-based holistic, affective and 
association driven (intuition) system coexists with an analytic, logical and reason 
oriented (reasoning) system. It is argued that the two systems do not operate 
autonomously, but rather the intuition system provides quick answers to problems of 
judgement, to which the reasoning system operates as a monitor. 
While it is argued that affect or emotion has a central role in the operation of the two 
system scheme, recent research also indicates that affect may also act as a specific 
type of heuristic. An affect heuristic is believed to occur when automatic and rapid 
affective responses 'substitute' more systematic, considered judgements. Direct 
substitution is able to occur, because representations of objects and events are 
'tagged' with affect, resulting in automatic responses to recalled elements. 
Substitution is the foundation of the heuristic process, in which readily recalled 
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attributes, such as affect or availability, substitute rational processes in the 
assessment of a judgment. 
To evaluate the impact of an affect heuristic, there is a requirement to understand 
how affect is manifested in observable behaviour. Without a quantifiable observation 
it is problematic as to whether a valid and reliable tool could be developed for an 
identifying an affect heuristic. Since it is commonly accepted in psychological 
research that words have affective qualities which impact on cognitive processes and 
objects, it is appropriate for this study to use affective words as the observable 
component of an affect heuristic. The measurement of which will occur through the 
application of semantic differential scales. 
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CHAPTER3 
STUDY METHODOLOGY 
Study design is guided by the research problem and the nature of the research 
questions being investigated (Moore, 2000). As the purpose of this study was to 
assess the impact of the affect heuristic on security expert risk perception, the 
methodology adopted was a qualitative approach that utilised research instruments to 
measure attitude. 
Study Procedure 
In selecting a qualitative approach, Isaac & Michael (1995) suggest that a functional 
study procedure should follow a descriptive format. The purpose of this type of 
procedure is to describe systematically, based on the research questions, the attitudes 
and characteristics of a given population in a factual and accurate manner. In order 
to reflect these attributes, the research process constituted the following stages 
identified in figure 4.1. 
Definition 
Data Collection 
Results 
Figure 4.1. Research Procedure 
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Definition 
The study was defined through the co~unication of a specific research question 
and a comprehensive review of existing research during the literature review. This 
process of definition and exploration enabled specific and achievable research 
objectives to be developed, which in tum, when addressed, allowed the research 
question to be appropriately and rigorously examined. 
Design 
The study design focused on the use of seven-point semantic differential scales (Best 
& Kahn, 1998; Lemon, 1973), which are similar to Likert scales in that respondents 
indicate an attitude between two extreme choices (Best & Kahn, 1998, p. 319). The 
semantic differential scales measured the sample population's attitude toward seven 
of nine risk characteristics identified by Slovic, et al. (1978) as comprising the 
factors of dread and familiarity. 
Table 4.1 
Measurable Risk Characteristics 
Low Dread 
Controllable 
Equitable 
Voluntary 
Dread 
High Dread 
Uncontrollable 
Not Equitable 
Involuntary 
(Fischhoff et al, 1978 & Slovic et al, 1986) 
Familiarity 
Familiar 
Old Risk 
Effect hnmediate 
Unfamiliar 
New Risk 
Effect Delayed 
The semantic differential was selected as the principal research instrument, because 
it closely aligned to the extreme choices available to the risk characteristics listed 
above. For example, a standard semantic differential adjective of good-bad and the 
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risk characteristic of low dread-high dread both capture an extreme range of attitude 
intensity in one scale. The seven scale semantic differential is identified in figure 4.2. 
Low Dread High Dread 
Controllable Uncontrollable 
Equitable to those Exposed Not Equitable to those Exposed 
Voluntary Involuntary 
Familiar Unfamiliar 
Old Risk New Risk 
Effect Immediate Effect Delayed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Figure 4.2 Risk Characteristic Semantic Differential Scales 
The seven semantic differential scales were designed to elicit attitude responses from 
the sample population to a series of security risk scenario. Each scenario focused on 
providing risk information for common and unique security issues, specifically 
robbery, assault, expatriate safety and industrial espionage. The purpose of selecting 
common and unique risks was to evaluate whether 'uniqueness' and 'profile' had an 
impact on attitude intensity (Appendix A- original security risk scenarios). 
The security risk scenarios were constructed with negative and neutral affective 
words linking analytical information in the form of 'objective' observations of each 
risk issue. The affective words were applied for the purpose of creating a neutral and 
negative orientation toward the scenarios. For example, a statement that "the police 
record a moderate level of assault in the local area" has a neutral orientation. 
However, if assault is substituted for violent crime, the statement tends to become 
negative. The affective words used in the final test scenarios were taken from the 
affect word list (ANEW), obtained with approval from the Center for the Study of 
Emotion and Attention at the University of Florida. 
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To enable the impact of the affect heuristic to be evaluated, two measurable versions 
of each scenario were developed. One version was orientated with neutral affective 
words and the other negative affective words. The neutral scenario aimed to create an 
attitude statement that was minimally influenced by affect, while the negative 
scenario utilised affect so as to introduce elements of the affect heuristic. The 
negative scenario's measurements were then compared against the measurements of 
the neutral scenario to identify variations in levels of dread and familiarity. The 
presence of a variation would indicate an impact from the affect heuristic. 
Both versions of each scenario were applied to the sample population. To address the 
issue of contamination due to scenario recollection, the test was applied in two stages 
separated by a six-week period. A combination of neutral and negative scenarios 
were provided in each stage. Although Nachmias & Nachmias (1992, p. 165) and 
Bums (1997) suggest that eight weeks is the minimum length of time between such 
re-tests, the limited timeframe available for this study meant a compromise period 
was required (Appendix B- Final security risk scenarios). 
Data Collection 
This stage ofthe research process consisted ofthe following steps: 
Stage 1: Test Development- Study Feasibility 
1. A pool of neutral and negative security risk scenarios to measure the impact the 
affect heuristic on the risk perception of security experts were developed. 
2. Security risk scenarios submitted to appropriate security experts to evaluate face 
and content validity. 
3. Security risk scenarios that lacked face and content validity were modified. 
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4. Finalised security risk scenarios were submitted to a 3rd year Security Science 
class at two different times, approximately 2 weeks apart. 
5. Reliability tests of Chronbach's alpha and paired sample t-tests were applied to 
the security risk scenarios. 
6. The security risk scenarios that failed to produce meaningful results and returned 
unacceptable reliability scores for the pilot study were removed from the final 
study. 
Stage 2: Administer Test- Final Phase 
7. The remaining security risk scenarios were ordered into a Final Test and 
packaged for distribution to the sample population. 
8. Test One containing questionnaire part one was administered to the sample 
population. 
9. Test Two containing questionnaire part two was administered to the sample 
population approximately 6 weeks after the first. 
10. The results were compiled and analysed. 
Results 
The semantic differential results for the assault and expatriate safety scenarios were 
examined individually and then compared as dread and familiarity representations in 
'factor space'. An analysis of the dread and familiarity factors established if the 
sample population reactions supported or rejected the resear~h question. Specifically, 
data interpretation occurred in four parts: 
1. Semantic differential profiles were constructed from the results of the neutral and 
negative security risk scenarios. 
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2. Semantic differential results from each security risk scenano were discussed 
independently. 
3. The semantic differential results from the security risk scenarios were compared 
and contrasted. 
4. The semantic differential results were presented in a spatial factor representation 
of dread and familiarity and discussed. 
Sample Population 
The sample population m this study were comprised of security experts from 
government and industry who undertake security risk assessments as part of their 
normal organisational/consultancy duties as a security advisor, manager, analyst or 
industry consultant. To ensure the requirement for 'expertise' was addressed, the 
sample population was selected using a criterion based on the ASIS International 
(2005), Certified Protection Professional (CPP) accreditation: 
• Nine years of experience in a self managed security role; or 
• Five years of experience in a self managed security role and a Bachelor Degree. 
A homogeneous non-probability sample of at least 20 security experts was selected 
for this study. The high degree of specialisation required for experts in the field of 
security, limited variations in the representativeness of the sample population. The 
respondents for this study were identified through peer networks and professional 
associations in the security industry. To maintain the integrity of the expertise 
criteria, the following controls were implemented for respondent suitability: 
• The eligibility criterion was outlined in the test pack, and the respondents advised 
that they should only complete the survey if they meet the criteria. 
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• Respondents were required to note their experience and qualifications against the 
criteria before their responses will be accepted. 
Initial distribution of the test pack occurred through email to a list of security experts 
previously identified as meeting the expertise criteria. These individuals were known 
personally through professional relationships and ASIS International Australian 
Chapter participation. There was no geographical limitation on distribution, with 
respondents coming from both domestic and international locations. 
Each respondent was asked to distribute the test pack to other security colleagues, 
who to their knowledge met the expertise criteria and for whom English was their 
first language (to maximise consistent interpretation). All respondents were 
requested to return Test One in electronic format by return email. A record of all 
eligible respondents was maintained so that Test Two could be directly distributed 
after six weeks for completion and return. 
Validity 
Due to the lengthy research procedure it was considered unfeasible to apply more 
~·· time consuming tests, such as construct validity. In this circumstance content and 
face validity were considered most appropriate. Both tests of validity were achieved 
by submitting the risk scenarios and semantic differential scales for examination to 
four security experts (two from academia and two from industry) to ensure they 
fulfilled their functional requirements. 
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Minor wording changes were identified with the questionnaire backgrounds and 
several scenarios. After modifications had been made, the test items were considered 
to be valid. At the conclusion of this process the Pilot Test was then conducted. 
Reliability 
Reliability of the test items was established by the application of Chronbach's alpha 
and paired-sample t-tests to semantic differential scales grouped under their factors 
of dread and familiarity. 
Chronbach's alpha is a test for a model internal consistency; it assesses the extent to 
which a set of test items can be treated as measuring a single latent variable. The 
paired-sample t-test is used to determine if there is a meaningful difference between 
the means of two sample populations. Both tests were run through SPSS statistical 
software. 
Limitations 
This study, like any research project, has a number of limitations that have been 
identified from the research methodology and the results of the pilot study. Where 
possible, action was taken to reduce the negative impact upon the tinal test. The 
following is a description of the limitations facing the study. 
The proposed sample size of 20-30 subjects does limit the ability to generalise 
outcomes of the study. The specialised profession of security experts allowed only 
limited number of subjects to be selected for the sample population. The resultant 
small sample size means that the attitudes assessed may not necessarily be 
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representative of the wider security expert population. This issue can only be 
overcome by collecting a sufficiently large sample population. 
There are several limitations associated with inferring meaning from observable 
displays of individual attitude. For a test instrument to effectively measure attitude, 
the researcher depends upon expressed opinion that is a true reflection of the 
subject's belief. However, there is a probability that the subject may conceal their 
attitude behind socially acceptable opinion (Thorndike, 1997). Lewin (1979) also 
highlights that test items may present subjects or issues of which they have no 
knowledge. 
Psychometric research has been criticized for treating risk as purely objective, and 
not accounting for cultural or social bias hidden in the quantitative analysis (Shaw & 
Shaw, 2001; Lupton, 1997). Given security experts operate in environments where 
strong social agendas form from highly politicised and emotive issues such as 
terrorism, the application of the psychometric paradigm for this study means the 
influence exerted by social agendas may not be accounted for. Although this 
limitation is inherent to the individualist approach, and in the context of this study, 
largely unavoidable, it is offset to some degree by the proven viability of the 
paradigmatic approach as a theoretical framework (Jackson, Allum & Gaskell, 2004 ). 
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CHAPTER4 
, PILOT STUDY 
A pilot study was undertaken to evaluate the suitability and reliability of the 
proposed security risk scenarios for assault, industrial espionage, robbery and 
expatriate safety. Secondary benefits of the pilot study included feedback from the 
sample population on the readability and lucidity of the test item instructions and 
scale construction. 
3rd year security science students from Edith Cowan University were selected as the 
sample population for the pilot study. This particular population was selected on the 
basis that: 
• they would possess a similar theoretical knowledge structure of the security 
discipline, including security risk, to that of security 'experts'; and 
• they would not draw from the limited field of security experts eligible to 
participate in the final study. 
Data Collection 
Test one, containing all neutral scenarios, was provided in person to a class of 3rd 
year security science students for voluntary completion. The ten participating 
students took between 15-25 minutes to complete the first test. The test was finalised 
with the students being requested to provide written feedback on the general 
'useability' of the test item. Students were also requested to record their name and 
email address so the ,second test could be distributed electronically. 
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Approximately three weeks after the initial test the second test was distributed by 
email to the participating students. Of the original ten participants, six completed and 
returned the second test in electronic format. Several attempts were made to contact 
the remaining students, but no responses were forthcoming. Although the final pilot 
study sample size was small, the response rate of 60% is considered acceptable in 
social research (Babbie, 1995). 
Data Collation 
The results from the pilot study were analysed to determine the reliability of the 
semantic differential scales and the security risk scenarios. The data analysis phase 
involved the following steps: 
1. The scores from each neutral and negative semantic differential scale were 
collated into four tables for the scenarios of assault, industrial espionage, robbery 
and expatriate safety (Raw Data Table - Appendix E). 
2. The mean and standard deviation for each neutral and negative semantic 
differential scale were calculated from the responses to both the first and the 
second test. 
3. The semantic differential scales for each scenario were grouped by the factor of 
dread (dread, control equity and voluntariness) and familiarity (familiarity, 
old/new and immediacy). 
4. A consolidated mean for the dread and familiarity factors were calculated from 
the mean of the grouped semantic differential scales. 
5. Internal consistency of the dread and familiarity factors for each scenario were 
·tested using Chronbach's alpha (run through SPSS). 
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6. Paired sample t-tests were undertaken of the dread and familiarity factors to 
identify the statistical significance between the neutral and negative scenarios 
(run through SPSS). 
Assault Scenario Data 
The sample population's reaction to the neutral and negative assault scenario resulted 
in an increase in dread and unfamiliarity for six of the seven 7-point semantic 
differential scales (1 =low dread/highly familiar and ?=high dread/very unfamiliar). 
Mean score increases were recorded for dread (5.17 rso 0·751 to 5.83 rso 0·981), control 
(3 .83 [SO 1.72] to 4.17 [SO 1.941) , equity.( 4.50 [SO 1.64] to 6.33 [SO 0·521) , familiarity (2.83 [SD 
1.721 to 3.33 rso 1.861), old/new (2.33 rso 1.371 to 3.17 rso 1.471) and immediacy (1.67 (SD 
0
·
521 to 2.33 [SD I.03J), while voluntariness (5.50 [SD 1.051 to 5.17 [so 1. 831) recorded the 
only mean score decrease or inverse relationship. The 'semantic differential profile' 
for the neutral (green) and negative (red) assault scenario is identified in figure 5.1 . 
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Figure 5.1 Semantic Differential Profile- Assault Scenario 
A consolidated neutral and negative mean score for both factors was calculated using 
the grouped neutral and negative mean scores from each semantic differential scale. 
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The dread factor risk characteristics of dread, control, equity and voluntariness 
combined to produce factor mean score increase of 4.75 [SD 0·471 to 5.38 [SD 0"691 . The 
familiarity factor risk characteristics of familiarity, old/new and immediacy also 
combined to produce a factor mean score increase of 2.28 [SD 0·441 to 2.94 [SD 0'411 • The 
spatial factor representation of dread and familiarity for the neutral (green) and 
negative (red) assault scenario is identified infigure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2 
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While the suitability of the assault scenano was supported by the meaningful 
--~--variation in reaction intensity identified in ' factor space', an examination of 
reliability was also required before the scenario could be accepted for the final study. 
Chronbach's alpha and paired-sample t-tests were used to test the neutral and 
negative semantic differential scales when grouped by their dread and familiarity 
factors. 
The assault scenario returned an acceptable (De V ellis, 1991) internal consistency 
coefficient of 0.76 and 0.80 for both the dread and familiarity factors respectively. 
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The paired-sample t-tests identified a statistically insignificant result for the dread 
factor [! (24) = .06, n>.05], but a statistically significant result for the familiarity 
factor [1 (18) = .00, n<.05]. These results, combined with the meaningful variation in 
reaction intensity displayed in ' factor space', provide an adequate level of support for 
the assault scenario to remain in the final test. 
Industrial Espionage Scenario Data 
The sample population's reaction to the neutral and negative industrial espionage 
scenario resulted in an increase in dread and unfamiliarity for four of the seven 7-
point semantic differential scales (1 =low dread/highly familiar and 7=high 
dread/very unfamiliar). The neutral and negative mean scores for dread (6.17 [SD 0·751 
and 6.17 [SD 1. 171) remained unchanged. Control (3 .33 [SD 2·501 to 2.67 [SD 1.21 1) and 
voluntariness (2.50 [SD 23 51 to 2.17 [SD 0·981) both recorded mean score decreases or 
inverse relationships, while equity (2.83 [SD 2.48) to 4.33 [SD 2·071) , familiarity (2.67 [SD 
1.37) to 3.00 [SD 1.4 1J), old/new (3.17 [SD 2·231 to 5.00 [SD 1.551) and immediacy (4.67 [SD 
1.971 to 5.00 [SD 2·191) all recorded mean score increases. The semantic differential 
profile for industrial espionage is identified infigure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3 · Semantic Differential Profile - Industrial Espionage 
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A consolidated neutral and negative mean score for the dread and familiarity factors 
was calculated using the neutral and negative mean scores of each semantic 
differential scale. The dread factor risk characteristics of dread, control, equity and 
voluntariness combined to produce factor mean score increase of 3.71 [SD 0·851 to 3.83 
[SD 0.481 . The familiarity factor risk characteristics of familiarity, old/new and 
immediacy also combined to produce a factor mean score increase of 3.50 [SD 0.44] to 
4.33 (so 0.4IJ. The spatial factor representation of dread and familiarity for the neutral 
and negative industrial espionage scenario is identified infigure 5.4. 
Figure 5.4 
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The 'factor space' representation for the industrial espwnage scenano displays a 
meaningful shift in reaction intensity for familiarity. However, there 1s little 
noticeable change in the level of reaction intensity for dread, with only a 0.12 
increase occurring on a 7 -point scale. This outcome suggested that the industrial 
espionage was unsuitable for the final test. To assess reliability, Chronbach's alpha 
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and paired-sample t-tests were used to test the neutral and negative semantic 
differential scales when grouped by their dread and familiarity factors. 
The industrial espionage scenario returned undesirable (De V ellis, 1991) internal 
consistency coefficients of 0.47 and 0.40 for the dread and familiarity factors 
respectively, while the paired-sample t-tests identified a statistically insignificant 
result for the dread factor [1 (24) = 1.00, Q>.05] and familiarity factor [1 (18) = .1 0, 
Q>.05]. Given the lack of meaningful variation in reaction intensity for the dread 
factor, the results for alpha and t-tests failed to provide a sufficient level of 
reliability, and supported the withdrawal of the industrial espionage scenario from 
the final test. 
Robbery Scenario Data 
The sample population's reaction to the neutral and negative robbery scenano 
resulted in an increase in dread and unfamiliarity for only two of the seven 7-point 
semantic differential scales (1 =low dread/highly familiar and ?=high dread/very 
unfamiliar). The neutral and negative mean scores for immediacy (2.00 [SD 1·26] and 
2.00 [so I.10l) remained unchanged. Dread (6.33 [SD 0·52l to 6.00 [SD 0·89l), control (4.00 
[so 1.79] to 3.83 [SD 1.47J), voluntariness (4.50 [SD 1.521 to 3.83 [so 1.831) and familiarity 
(2.83 [SD 0·98l to 2.33 [SD 1.82]) all recorded mean score decreases, while only equity 
(4.83 [SD 2.48] to 5.83 [SD 1.1 7]) and old/new (2.00 [SD 0·89] to 2.17 [SD 1.47]) recorded a 
mean score increase. The semantic differential profile for robbery is identified in 
figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5 
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Semantic Differential Profile - Robbery Scenario 
A consolidated neutral and negative mean score for the dread and familiarity factors 
was calculated using the neutral ·and negative mean scores of each semantic 
differential scale. The dread factor risk characteristics of dread, control, equity and 
voluntariness combined to produce a slight mean score decrease of 4.92 [SD 0·82l to 
4.88 [SD 0·40l . The familiarity factor risk characteristics of familiarity, old/new and 
immediacy also combined to produce a slight mean score decrease of 2.28 [SD 0·19) to 
2.17 [SD 033 l. The spatial factor representation of dread and familiarity for the neutral 
(green) and negative (red) robbery scenario is identified in figure 5. 6. 
Figure 5.6 
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The robbery scenario ' factor space' displayed a marginal negative or inverse 
relationship for both the dread and familiarity factors. The change in reaction 
intensity for both factors was insignificant, with only a 0.04 decrease for dread and 
0.09 decrease for familiarity occurring on a 7-point ·scale. The failure of this scenario 
to produce a meaningful positive variation for both factors suggested it should be 
removed from the final test. To verify this conclusion, Chronbach's alpha and paired-
sample t-tests were used to test the reliability of the neutral and negative semantic 
differential scales when grouped by their dread and familiarity factors. 
The test of alpha returned an acceptable (De Vellis, 1991) internal consistency 
coefficient of 0.84 and 0.75 for both the dread and familiarity factors respectively. 
However, the paired-sample t-tests identified statistically insignificant results for 
both the dread factor[! (24) = .91 , Q>.05] and familiarity factor[! (18) = .61, Q>.05] . 
While these outcomes indicate the neutral and negative scenario provided a high 
level of internal consistency (alpha), the results for statistical significance (p-value) 
reduce the scenario's reliability. These results, combined with the lack of meaningful 
variation in reaction intensity for the dread and familiarity factors, supported the 
withdrawal of the robbery scenario from the final test. 
Expatriate Safety Scenario Data 
The sample population's reaction to the neutral and negative expatriate safety 
scenario resulted in an increase in dread and unfamiliarity for six of the seven 7-point 
semantic differential scales (1 =low dread/highly familiar and 7=high dread/very 
unfamiliar). Dread (5.50 [SD 1.871 to 6.33 [SD 0·521), control ( 4.50 [SO 1.641 to 5.83 [SD 0·751), 
equity (5.17 [So 0·981 to 5.83 (so 1.941), voluntariness (4.17 [SD 1. 831 to 5.00 [SD 2·001), 
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familiarity (3.67 [SO 1.751 to 4.17 (SO 2"321) and old/new (2.50 (SO 1.221 to 4.00 [so 2·191) all 
recorded mean score increases, while immediacy (2.67 (SO 1.861 to 1.83 [So l.l 7l) 
recorded the only mean score decrease or inverse relationship. The semantic 
differential profile for expatriate safety is identified rnfigure 5. 7. 
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Figure 5.7 Semantic Differential Profile- Expatriate Safety Scenario 
A consolidated neutral and negative mean score for the dread and familiarity factors 
was calculated using the neutral and negative mean scores of each semantic 
differential scale. The dread factor risk characteristics of dread, control, equity and 
voluntariness combined to produce a mean score increase of 4.83 [SO 0·41 1 to 5.75 [So 
0
·
781
. The familiarity factor risk characteristics of familiarity, old/new and immediacy 
also combined to produce a mean score increase of 2.94 [SO 0·341 to 3.34 (So 0·631. The 
spatial factor representation of dread and familiarity for the neutral (green) and 
negative (red) expatriate safety scenario is identified infigure 5.8. 
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The suitability of the expatriate safety scenario was supported by its 'factor space' 
representation, which displayed a meaningful variation in reaction intensity between 
the neutral and negative scenarios. To support this outcome, Chronbach's alpha and 
paired-sample t-tests were used to test the reliability of the neutral and negative 
semantic differential scales when grouped by their dread and familiarity factors. 
The expatriate safety scenano returned an acceptable (De V ellis, 1991) internal 
consistency coefficient of 0.81 for dread, but an undesirable score of .41 for 
familiarity, while the paired-sample t-tests identified a statistically insignificant 
result for both dread[! (24) = .21, n>.05] and familiarity[! (18) = .75, n>.05]. While 
these results lacked a high level of reliability in both tests, the meaningful variation 
in reaction intensity displayed in 'factor space' provided sufficient support for the 
expatriate safety scenario to remain in the final test. 
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Data Analysis and Interpretation 
The data interpretation discussion broadly addresses the research objectives set out 
for this project; being to discuss the semantic differential results from the neutral and 
negative security risk scenarios and to discuss the semantic differential data when 
presented in a spatial factor representation of dread and familiarity. The research 
objective to prepare semantic differential profiles was presented in the data analysis 
section. 
Factor Space Discussion 
The neutral and negative assault, ro?bery and expatriate safety scenarios all occupied 
the same spatial quadrant (lower right) of high dread risk and familiarity with risk. 
However, with industrial espionage, its neutral scenario occupied the low dread risk 
and familiarity with risk quadrant (lower left), while the negative scenario occupied 
the low dread risk and unfamiliarity with risk quadrant (upper left). These 'factor 
space' representations, identified in figure 5.9, suggested the presence of several 
underlying themes. 
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Where a 'person' was likely to be the 'victim' of a security risk, as in the case of 
assault, robbery and expatriate safety, higher levels of dread (mean) were experienced. 
However, where an entity was the 'victim', as in industrial espionage, the level of 
dread (mean) experienced was significantly lower. An 'explanation for this variation can 
be found in a fundamental security principle that proposes people to be more 
important than information and physical assets. Given the sample population were 
third year security science students, it could be expected that such a theoretical 
principle would influence their perception and assessment of security risk. 
Industrial espwnage was also umque m that it demonstrated a higher level of 
unfamiliarity in factor space, particularly for the negative scenario, when compared 
to assault, robbery and expatriate safety. This reaction was not unexpected, given the 
relative uniqueness of industrial espionage, its limited exposure in the public arena 
and the student sample population's lack of practical 'real life' experience in this 
area of security. 
Assault Scenario - Discussion 
Between the neutral and negative scenarios, the dread factor experienced a variation 
from slightly too moderately dreadful (4.75 to 5.38), while the familiarity factor 
experienced a variation :from moderately too slightly familiar (2.28 to 2.94). In term 
of an overall response to the scenario, these outcomes indicate the sample population 
was largely familiar or comfortable in their knowledge of assault and its effects, but 
tended to be uncomfortable with the environment in terms of the likelihood and 
consequence of an assault. 
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Although the reactions to dread and familiarity were opposed to each other on the 7-
point semantic differential scale, the variation between the neutral and negative 
scenarios for each factor was virtually identical, with 0.63 for dread and 0.66 for 
familiarity. While these variations were in themselv'es considered meaningful, such a 
small deviation between the two variances suggested the affective words had a 
similar impact on both the dread and familiarity factors. 
Industrial Espionage Scenario -Discussion 
The dread factor experienced a variation (mean total) between the negative and neutral 
scenarios that remained in the neutral dread range (3.71 to 3.83), while the 
familiarity factor experienced a variation that also remained in the neutral familiarity 
range (3.50 to 4.33). In terms of an overall response to the scenario, these outcomes 
indicated the sample population tended to be uncertain in their knowledge of 
industrial espionage and the impact of the scenario environment. This reaction was 
reflected to a large degree in dread, with a tendency toward uncertainty also being 
experienced. The orientation toward 'undecided' for both the familiarity and dread 
responses made this scenario unsuitable for the final test. 
Robbery Scenario - Discussion 
Between the neutral and negative scenarios, the dread factor experienced a variation 
that remained in the slightly high dread range (4.92 to 4.88), while the familiarity 
factor experienced a variation that remained in the moderately familiar (2.28 to 2.17) 
range. fu terms of an overall response to the scenario, these outcomes indicated the 
sample population was for the most part certain in their knowledge of robbery. 
However, the fact that dread became slightly more neutral suggested risk 
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information in the scenario was conflicting or ambiguous, and as such precluded the 
sample population from forming a definitive attitude. 
Expatriate Safety Scenario - Discussion 
The dread factor experienced a variation between the neutral and negative scenarios 
from slightly tending toward moderately dreadful (4.83 to 5.38), while the familiarity 
factor experienced a variation that remained in the slightly familiar range (2.94 to 
3.34). In terms of an overall response to the scenario, these outcomes indicated the 
sample population felt they had some knowledge of expatriate safety and its effects, 
but was largely uncomfortable with the environment in regard to the likelihood and 
consequence of an incident that may impact on expatriate safety. 
Conclusion 
Slovic et al (2004) argue that an affect heuristic occurs when automatic and rapid 
affective responses to events and objects substitute an individual's more systematic, 
considered judgements. Finucane et al (cited in Jackson, Allum & Gaskell, 2004) 
further contend that an affect heuristic is pervasive and extends to 'objective' 
numerical assessments of risk. These propositions appear to find tentative support in 
the pilot study data, which displayed meaningful variations in perceived levels of 
dread and familiarity in two of the four security risk scenarios. 
The use of affective words, as the observable and measurable component of an affect 
heuristic, was also tentatively supported by the pilot study data, with meaningful 
variations in reaction intensity recorded between a number of neutral and negative 
scenarios. This outcome provided further support for the psychophysiological 
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argument that words have affective qualities that act as stimuli for cognitive 
processes and objects (Bradley & Lang 1999). 
These conclusions drawn from the pilot study data ultimately provided tentative 
support for the research question - Does the introduction of affect to the 
communication of security risk information lead to variations in security risk 
experts' perceived levels of dread and familiarity? 
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